1. As strategic partners and two predominant “centres of power” on the European continent, Russia and the European Union hold primary responsibility for maintaining regional security in Wider Europe. This vision was embodied in the Roadmap on Cooperation within a Common Space of External Security adopted at the Russia-EU summit in May 2005 in Moscow. Over the years, significant progress has been achieved in its implementation.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that the exploration of the existing huge potential in the key area of military and political cooperation has so far been slow, lagging behind the development of our bilateral trade and economic relations and the institutional development of the European Union itself.
Allow me to present the case in favour of a qualitative strengthening of our cooperation in this field.
Firstly, the protracted debt crisis of the eurozone continues to place significant budgetary limitations on the development of the EU CSDP. Given this, and in view of the dawning US “pivot to Asia”, the EU admittedly needs “low-cost” cooperative solutions, enabling military and technological self-sufficiency of its peace-keeping potential. Otherwise, the EU will hardly be able to retain its positions as a capable player on the global market of crisis management.
Secondly, the aggravating financial crisis has coincided with dramatic geopolitical turbulences in the Southern periphery of the EU. We are witnessing a growing escalation and regional proliferation of cross-border challenges. Russia and the EU, as neighbouring “safeguards of regional security”, should be vitally interested in joint actions to stabilise our common “Southern belt”.
Thirdly, the Russia-EU “Partnership for Modernisation” initiative launched in 2010 is a powerful incentive moving us towards deeper technological cooperation. It would be useful for this initiative to include a specialised branch of cooperation focused on development and production of military equipment, especially those based on cutting-edge technologies.
In my view, there is no reasonable alternative to genuine Russia-EU partnership in the field of CSDP. Take, for example, the “pooling and sharing” concept launched in 2010. We do not see any reasons preventing Russia from contributing to the implementation by the EU of this initiative. As far as we know, in general it allows the participation of third countries in “pooling and sharing” projects, albeit on the basis of specific bilateral arrangements and on a limited scope. In this context it would be important to translate into practice cooperation between Russia’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation and the European Defence Agency (EDA) – something Brussels has openly been interested in for some time.
We expect that the Conference on Military and Political Aspects of European Security organised by the Ministry of Defence of Russia on 23-24 May in Moscow will provide an impetus to the Russia-EU security cooperation.
There is still an urgent need to establish Russia-EU operational bilateral dialogue mechanisms allowing for adoption of joint decisions, including in the field of crisis management, and strategic control over their implementation. Let me remind you that there has already been an attempt to create such a mechanism. I am referring to an initiative put forward by Germany in June 2010 in Meseberg on establishing a Russia-EU Joint Committee on Foreign Policy and Security at ministerial level. We expect that a strategic vision will prevail in the EU on this issue, which should not be politically motivated.
2. In the first decade of the century Russia and the EU accumulated some practical experience of cooperation in the field of crisis management, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Chad/Central African Republic. Furthermore, the fight against maritime piracy is one of the most important areas of our cooperation in countering new challenges and threats. Thanks to joint efforts of the Russian Navy and the maritime forces of EU Member States in the framework of the ATALANTA operation, last year the number of pirate attacks in the region of the Horn of Africa was significantly reduced.
However, such cooperation will remain episodic unless we put it on a firm legal basis.
The road to success lies in following the principle of equality on which the parties agreed as early as in 2008. In our view, the future arrangement should not be a priori limited to just one possible option, namely Russia’s participation in EU-led operations. On the contrary, it should provide for a wide range of configurations of joint missions, from which Russia and the EU could chose in each case, based on the geographical considerations and specific requirements of the given crisis situation (under the auspices of Russia, the EU, in the form of two parallel operations or operation under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE).
The Russia-EU Ad-hoc Working Group established in 2010, which serves as a platform for developing practical cooperation in the field of crisis management and combatting maritime piracy, has proven to be a useful forum for discussions on our military and political cooperation.
3. Missile defence remains one of our priority issues in relations with NATO (the EU, as we know, refrains from discussing this topic). It seems like our partners are hesitant to follow the proposal put forward by President Vladimir Putin in 2007 – to get together, jointly analyze and identify sources of threat for all Euro-Atlantic countries and then consider creating a system able to meet this objective that the US sees as preventing threats coming from outside the Euro-Atlantic Region. As our partners have indicated that they have come up with their own solution and do not need our intellectual support, we are urging them – as we see in this scheme a threat or, at least, some risks for the Russian strategic forces – to put on paper their vocal pledges, namely that their system is not would not against us.
We are currently examining the proposals recently presented by the US side on further developing the dialogue on missile defence and on further steps by the US in Alaska and on the East Coast, as well as in Japan and in North-Eastern Asia on the whole, where, if put together, it would be no exaggeration to say that a truly global AMD system is being established.
That is why we need legal guarantees and a negotiated list of criteria allowing for the verification of these guarantees at each stage and that the US global AMD system development serves the initial goal, namely that of preventing missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic Region.
The attempt to strengthen the European and US security through an AMD system poses risks for Russian security, thus violating the political commitment taken in the framework of the Russia-NATO Council. We are determined in our support for the universal nature of the principle of common, indivisible and equal security. To this end in 2008 Russia put forward an initiative to sign the Treaty on European Security enshrining the legally binding principle of indivisibility of security.
