- Mr. Logvinov, 10 February is the Russian Diplomacy Day. The Russian Permanent Mission in Brussels will mark it in an environment where communication through diplomatic channels with the EU is, to put it mildly, difficult. Could you please tell us whether minimal contacts are still maintained, at least at a technical level, or whether the EU, following the logic of "isolating" Russia in the international arena, has completely cut off all contacts?
Contacts with European institutions are maintained. We communicate with them at a level and in a way that we consider necessary to meet Russian national interests and in view of the hybrid war that the European Union is waging against our country.
I would single out a particular issue on the agenda, namely ensuring unhindered transit to and from the Kaliningrad region. First of all, the European Union has obligations towards Russia to guarantee the freedom of such transit. Yet, time and again, Brussels has failed to take them into account when adopting new “packages” of sanctions. Therefore, we have to remind it of its obligations on a regular basis.
We carry on official correspondence with EU institutions, a major element of our work, to draw their attention to the crimes of the Kiev regime, the violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in EU Member States, the glorification of Nazism and the intensified campaign to destroy Soviet memorials in the Baltic countries. First and foremost, we want the EU to react – and in the end to acknowledge the double standards. By choosing to remain silent, Brussels would confirm that it condones the perpetrators of terrorist acts against Russians, as well as those who, in contravention of all international obligations and EU norms, deny their citizens the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, and those who are rewriting not only our but also European history.
- Do you have any non-political contacts in areas such as energy and food supplies, humanitarian cooperation or visa issues?
At this point, we have nothing substantive to discuss with the EU. This applies to all the areas you mentioned – energy, trade, humanitarian exchanges. We are not going to run around begging the EU for anything. First, we will achieve the set tasks, and then we will see what we can talk to the EU about. In the meantime, the fact remains that Brussels has - easily and effortlessly - cut off all practical cooperation with us and set the course for a complete separation from Russia. Yet, it has gone so far in isolating our country that it risks finding itself on the sidelines of the ongoing transformation processes in international relations. So, I think that the best thing to do now is to let the European Union remain sincere in its delusions.
- What about Russia-EU trade statistics? What was the trend in 2023?
For obvious reasons, the European Union is no longer an important trading partner for Russia. Brussels has taken the path of economic war, imposing endless sanctions against our country and trying to meddle in Moscow's economic relations with third parties.
As expected, Russian-EU trade followed a downward trend in 2023. According to Eurostat data, Russia dropped from fifth to tenth place in the list of the EU's top trading partners, calculated on the basis of trade turnover in January-November 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. In the eleven months of 2023, Russia's trade turnover with the EU fell by 66.1% compared with the same period in 2022, from 243.5 billion euros to 82.5 billion euros. EU imports of Russian goods plummeted to 46.9 billion euros, down 75.6%, and EU exports of goods to Russia decreased to 35.6 billion euros, down 30.3%.
Brussels cannot ignore the fact that such a collapse in our trade affects the lives of ordinary Europeans. But if anyone asks questions, the European bureaucrats always have a single excuse - the need to counter the so-called "Russian threat".
- Do you know how many Russian tourists visited the EU last year despite the restrictions in its visa policy?
I am sure that the EU policy of "closing doors" to Russian tourists is not doing it any good either. I don't think anyone today would dare to say how many visitors European museums have lost. Of course, the decline in the number of Russian tourists over the past two years is not only due to the tightening of visa policies or the restrictions on air travel imposed by Brussels, but also to the increasingly acute problems facing the West, especially the migration crisis. Many people simply do not want to go to Europe. It is no longer that shiny.
- The EU has come up with a rather complicated scheme that would allow to accumulate the so-called extraordinary revenues from the "frozen" funds of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on separate accounts and then use this money to support Ukraine. Do you think this measure is legally sound? Why have they proposed such a complicated mechanism?
The "freezing" of our country's assets is an illegitimate measure, and all the so-called "mechanisms" being developed for the use of funds from the Central Bank of Russia are purely fraudulent schemes. According to international law, the property of a foreign state enjoys jurisdictional immunity, and the European Union has no and cannot have any legal basis for transferring confiscated Russian assets or their proceeds to Ukraine.
The Russian position is well known and, importantly, shared by the vast majority of countries in the world. The EU is well aware of this, which is why - as is probably the norm in a community of thieves - it carries out such work in secret. Anyway, decisions to use foreign assets in its own interests will undoubtedly affect Brussels, damaging in particular the reputation of the European Union and the stability of the eurozone. This will certainly send a negative message to foreign investors and third country governments, who will logically ask: is there any point in investing in the EU if your capital can be stolen? Hardly anyone will regard the EU states as a reliable jurisdiction. Well, you reap what you sow.
- Some time has passed since the EU has partially shifted away from Russian energy. Is it now possible to draw conclusions about how this has affected the EU economy, especially those countries that were the biggest consumers of Russian energy?
None of the measures taken by the European Union to "punish" Russia to its own detriment can be explained in any logical way, not even in terms of economic expediency. The energy sector is one of the most striking examples.
Let me remind you that, as part of its sanctions "packages", Brussels first banned imports of Russian coal (starting from August 2022), then crude oil (from December 2022) and oil products (from February 2023). The EU has drastically reduced its purchases of Russian gas: according to Eurostat, its share of total EU gas imports was only 11.8% in the third quarter of 2023. The share of American LNG purchased by Europe has increased significantly (up to 48.5% of total EU LNG imports in the third quarter of 2023), making it dependent on the goodwill of its overseas "partners".
After restricting Russian energy supplies, the EU was forced to put its economy on a "dry diet". It has been stagnating since autumn 2022. For several quarters in a row, the EU has recorded GDP growth rates close to zero (in the third quarter of 2023, it was 0.0% for the EU and -0.1% for the euro area). The overall growth rate in 2023 is expected to be just 0.6% - with Germany, the EU's largest economy, falling into recession. Soaring energy prices triggered unprecedentedly high inflation in the eurozone, which reached a record high of 10.6% year-on-year in October 2022. This led to a fall in real incomes and a drop in consumer demand. Europe's agricultural sector has been hit hard: the rising cost of fuel and lubricants remains one of the reasons for farmers' protests.
The EU's manufacturing sector, especially its energy-intensive industries, has suffered the most (in November 2023, EU industrial production was down by 5.8% compared with November 2022). Higher production costs due to rising energy prices have severely undermined the global competitiveness of European industry, leading to lower demand for manufactured goods, relocation of production to the US and the closure of some companies.
- Elections to the European Parliament will be held this summer, then a new European Commission will be formed, and a new head of the European Council will be agreed upon. Opinion polls suggest that the political composition of the European Parliament could change significantly. In your opinion, should we also expect changes in Europe's foreign policy towards Russia?
We do not expect any positive changes in the EU's policy towards Russia, especially in the short term. The main point is that the EU has already evolved into an anti-Russian bloc. And many of the developments observed here today show that the EU will continue to be obsessed with, and inspired by, confrontation with our country. After all, Brussels makes no secret of its willingness to play the long game, even after a failed "blitzkrieg". And this is confirmed by the increasingly frequent mantra that the fate of the EU depends on the outcome of the Russian special military operation.
As far as the European elections are concerned, here is a reality check: ordinary citizens have no influence whatsoever on the actual appointment of the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council. The situation is, by and large, unique, but it obviously suits the current political elite.
The results of the European Parliament elections will probably make European officials a little anxious, but no more than that. After all, the tedious wait for the European elections is no match for the anxious anticipation of the outcome of the US ballot, the results of which will really determine a lot here.
Thus, one can hardly expect the new EU leaders to include anyone with the political will to honestly acknowledge the strategic mistakes made by Brussels in recent years and to work on fixing them.
- At the 1 February Summit, the EU heads of state and government took a political decision to set up a facility to provide long-term financing for Ukraine. Why do you think a long-term plan until 2027 was needed, is it related to the upcoming elections and possible changes in the political landscape of the EU as a whole and in individual countries?
Setting up a "Ukraine Facility" under the revised EU Multiannual Financial Framework, Brussels is trying to demonstrate its intention to support Ukraine till the end, so to speak – but unlikely till death do them part.
By imposing a long-term funding model on the Member States, the European bureaucracy wanted to protect itself from the eventual future deviation of a number of European capitals from the pro-Ukrainian course - all decisions on the use of funds will be taken by qualified majority rather than by consensus. In other words, if certain Member States oppose the financial injections, their opinion will be disregarded. At the same time, those who find themselves "in opposition" will always be able to present their disagreement as a sovereign decision in their national interest.
- Calls to prepare for a possible clash with Russia have become more frequent in the EU. What do you think is the purpose of such statements? Could they be an attempt to justify military spending by pointing to the problems with arms supplies to Ukraine in the US?
You are right, the rhetoric has got tougher recently. Local politicians are trying to instil fear in the minds of ordinary Europeans: "the Russians are coming" and we must stop them before it is too late. I think the military hysteria is not just about trying to justify spending on Ukraine to ordinary Europeans. In fact, they are proposing to invest even more political, financial, economic and military resources not just to "support Ukraine for as long as it takes", but to "ensure its victory whatever it takes". We rather see a deliberate policy to escalate the conflict and raise the stakes. This could also explain why the EU is so categorical in its rejection of any initiatives to resolve the conflict by political and diplomatic means. As absurd as it may seem, many minds in the European Quarter may probably be dwelling on the idea that Russia is not done yet and that they need to push a little harder. We must warn those who today try to present the situation in Ukraine as an existential crisis for the European Union: it is the policy that Brussels has adopted and continues to pursue towards our country that could have disastrous consequences for it.
- How would you assess the steps taken by the EU to counter so-called disinformation, the strengthening of EU regulation of the Internet, in particular of online platforms, and the entry into force of relevant legislation?
Let us dot the i's: the EU is not fighting disinformation, but "undesirable" sources of information. Anything inconsistent with the Western mainstream is severely censored. The information space is being cleansed. The aim is to cut off European society from alternative media and resources. At the same time, by tightening the "information screws", the Eurobureaucracy is trying to mobilise the local electorate in the context of the European Parliament elections.
Countering the "Russian threat" is the main pretext for regulating information flows. This is quite natural - basically, they are waging a war against our country on the information battlefield. As in other areas, Brussels is actively resorting to illegitimate measures, imposing endless sanctions against Russian journalists and restricting the work of our media.
At the same time, the European Union - seizing the opportunity, so to speak - has decided to tighten control over the players in the information space in general. Legislative proposals receive sounding names, such as the "Defence of Democracy Package" or the "Digital Services Act". In reality, Brussels wants to outline the framework for the functioning of the online space and to unify the media market in all Member States. Thus, under the guise of increasing transparency of media and NGO funding, protecting journalists' rights, and fighting disinformation, the EU is in fact arming itself with levers to influence the information market and its participants in its own interests and according to the situation. It is up to European readers, viewers and Internet users to decide to what extent all this serves their interests.
